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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-1919

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.
ERIC MACKIE,
Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cr-00617)
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
June 9, 2006
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed July 28, 2006)

OPINION OF THE COURT

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

After his arrest and indictment for possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, Eric
Mackie sought suppression of the weapon on grounds that the weapon was seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For the reasons that follow,
and substantially for the reasons expressed by the District Court in its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, we affirm the court’s denial of Mackie’s motion to suppress. We add
the following to underscore our agreement with the court’s decision.

I. Background
The circumstances leading to Mackie’s arrest are fairly straightforward. On March
16, 2003, Gregory Gillespie, and other members of the Narcotic Strike Force, set up a
surveillance near the intersection of Park and Pike Streets in North Philadelphia, a “high
crime area.” Emil Blackly, a drug dealer, was under surveillance by Gillespie. While
under surveillance, Blackly conducted what appeared to be two separate drug
transactions, one with Steven Tillery and one with Kenny Gilliard. In his transaction with
Tillery, Blackly first received money, then stepped behind a car and picked up a baggie,
which he then placed in his jacket pocket. From the baggie, Blackly handed Tillery
several objects later discovered to be packets of crack cocaine. Shortly after Tillery left
the scene, Blackly conducted his transaction with Gilliard. This transaction proved
similar: Blackly first received money, then gave Gilliard objects from the baggie in his
jacket pocket.
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After Blackly’s transaction with Gilliard, defendant Mackie arrived and began
speaking with Blackly. Blackly reached towards the baggie in his jacket pocket, but upon
observing Blackly’s movement, Officer Gillespie, under the impression that Blackly was
executing another drug transaction, ordered his team of police officers to swarm the two
men. As Mackie attempted to flee the scene, the officers halted him and ordered him to
lay down. During the ensuing pat down search, the arresting officer felt what appeared to
be a handgun, reached in and retrieved a loaded .9 millimeter handgun. As a result,
Mackie was arrested and thereafter pled guilty to a one count indictment under
§ 922(g)(1).
Mackie asserts that the District Court should have granted his motion to suppress
because the search that uncovered his firearm was unreasonable, in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. In support of this claim, Mackie makes two arguments. First, Mackie
argues that there was no probable cause to support the search of his body. Second, he
argues that there were no particularized and articulable facts causing the police to believe
that he was armed and dangerous so as to justify a frisk for weapons. For these reasons,
Mackie requests that the denial of his motion to suppress reversed and the case be
remanded for trial.1
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“This Court reviews the District Court's denial of a motion to suppress for clear
error as to the underlying factual findings and exercises plenary review of the District
Court's application of the law to those facts.” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336
(3d. Cir. 2002). This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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II. Analysis
We believe that the police had probable cause to arrest Mackie, and pursuant to
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), grounds to search him. The Supreme Court
has recognized that probable cause is a “fluid concept,” not readily reducible to a “neat
set of legal rules.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). However, in the recent
case of Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003), the Court laid down two
guidelines for determining whether police have probable cause: 1) there must be a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt determined from the totality of the circumstances,
and 2) the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the individual searched.
Mackie argues that there was no reasonable ground to justify a search because his
transaction with Blackly was different from the earlier transactions with Tillery and
Gilliard. We cannot agree.
The similarities among the three transactions, and the surrounding circumstances,
support Officer Gillespie’s belief that Mackie was taking part in a drug transaction. Not
only did the transaction between Mackie and Blackly occur in the same location as, and
only a few minutes after, Blackly’s earlier transactions, but just before the police
approached, Blackly reached toward the pocket from which he had previously produced
drugs. In light of Officer Gillespie’s expertise and experience,2 based on these
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Officer Gillespie stated that he believed Mackie was involved in a drug
transaction because of his experience and belief of the background facts. App. at 27a. In
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996), the Supreme Court observed that “a
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observations alone, his suspicion that a third drug transaction might be taking place
provided reasonable grounds for an arrest. That the location of the transaction was a
“high crime area” further supports the reasonableness of the arrest, as does the fact that
Mackie attempted to flee as the police were approaching. See Carrol v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 159-60 (1925) (noting that courts are bound to take notice of “public facts”
such as local criminal activity); Sibron v. New York 392 U.S. 40, 66 (1968) (observing
that fleeing the crime scene when approached by law enforcement officers is relevant in
determining if there are proper grounds for an arrest).
On these facts, the police had probable cause to arrest Mackie for taking part in a
drug transaction. According to the Supreme Court in Chimel, “it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the
latter might seek to use.” Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. Under the facts and circumstances of
this case, the search of Mackie was incident to a lawful arrest and not in violation of his
constitutional rights. The District Court did not err in denying Mackie’s motion to
suppress.

III. Conclusion

police officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise. The
background facts provide a context for the historical facts, and when seen together yield
inferences that deserve deference.” The deference we must afford Officer Gillespie under
Ornelas supports our conclusion that his belief that Mackie was involved in a drug
transaction was reasonable.
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For the reasons stated above, we affirm the District Court’s denial of Mackie’s
motion to suppress evidence.
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